#### First, when answering any question—whether mathematical, personal, or ethical, we could take two approaches. 1] attempt to find the right answer, 2] attempt to use the best way to determine the right answer. While studying calculus helps me understand how to get the right answer, plugging an equation into Wolf Ram Alpha would be more likely to be correct.

#### This is distinction between analytic and regulative epistemology. Analytic seeks to enumerate those conditions by which one can be said to have satisfied the reductive criteria of knowledge. Regulative epistemology recognizes the plurality of epistemic projects and devotes itself to how we should practically make decisions. It is a question of intellectual virtues, skills one should inculcate should they think well.

WOODS AND ROBERTS 10 (Intellectual Virtues: An Essay in Regulative Epistemology (Advances in Cognitive Models & Arch). January 4, 2010)

The triviality of standard epistemology’s examples is due in part to the historical preoccupation with skepticism. If one cannot secure so simple a claim as “ I have two hands” or “ The world has existed for quite a while” against the mischief of evil demons and manipulative brain scientists, it makes little sense to worry about how we know difficult truths about the causes of the Second World War or the structure of DNA. Anti-skeptical maneuvers are a strong motif in the history of philosophy: Plato opposes the Sophists, Augustine the academic skeptics, Descartes Montaigne, Reid Hume, and Moore and Wittgenstein set themselves against skepticism inspired by Russell. However dominant anti-skepticism may be historically, some of epistemology’s most productive moments— in Aquinas, Kant, Plantinga— arose because philosophers were willing to set aside skeptical worries and look into what ordinary practitioners of science, religion, politics, and humanistic inquiry were willing to call knowledge. Intellectual virtues of the kind that interest Zagzebski and us seem likely to have relevance to high-end kinds of knowledge like scientific discoveries, the subtle understanding of difficult texts, moral self-knowledge, and knowledge of God, while being marginal to knowing, upon taking a look, that a bird is outside my window, or that what is in front of me is white paper. Given the central place of knowledge and understanding in human life, one would expect epistemology to be one of the most fascinating and enriching fields of philosophy and itself an important part of an education for life. We might expect that any bright university student who got all the way to her junior year without dipping her mind in an epistemology course would have to hang her head in shame of her cultural poverty. But the character and preoccupations of much of the epistemology of the twentieth century disappoint this expectation. We think that the new emphasis on the virtues and their relation to epistemic goods has the potential to put epistemology in its rightful place. And we hope that the present book, whatever its many shortcomings in detail, will suggest the rich ways in which epistemology-—the study of knowledge and related human goods— connects with ethical and political issues, with the practice of science and other forms of inquiry, with religion and spirituality, with appreciation of the arts, and with the enterprise of education.

#### They continue

Nicholas Wolterstorff distinguishes two kinds of epistemology, which he calls “analytic” and “regulative” . Analytic epistemology aims to produce theories of knowledge, rationality, warrant, justification, and so forth, and proceeds by attempting to define these terms. The English-speaking epistemology of the twentieth century is chiefly of this kind, and all of the virtue epistemologies of the last twenty-five years have been attempts to turn the intellectual virtues to the purposes of analytic epistemology. Regulative epistemology, which is the kind mostly practiced by Locke and Descartes and others of their period, does not aim to produce a theory of knowledge (though something like classical foundationalism does get produced as a by-product by Locke and Descartes). Instead, it tries to generate guidance for epistemic practice, “ how we ought to conduct our understandings, what we ought to do by way of forming beliefs” (p. xvi). Regulative epistemology is a response to perceived deficiencies in people’s epistemic conduct, and thus is strongly practical and social, rather than just an interesting theoretical challenge for philosophy professors and smart students. This kind of epistemology aims to change the (social) world. According to Wolterstorff, Locke’s regulative epistemology was a response to the social and intellectual crisis created by the breakup of medieval Christendom’s intellectual consensus. As Locke and others saw it, people’s intellectual lives needed to be reformed-— based on reason, rather than tradition or passions— because only thus could disagreements about the most fundamental issues, along with the resulting social conflicts, be resolved. But Locke also saw the need for reformation as perennial and genetically human: “I think there are a great many natural defects in the understanding capable of amendment.” Since “we are all short sighted” , seeing things from our own particular angle and not possessing comprehensive faculties, we need to learn the habit and inclination to consult others whose opinions differ from our own and read outside our discipline.21 In effect, Wolterstorff distinguishes two kinds of regulative epistemology, a rule-oriented kind and a habit-oriented kind (see pp. 152—4). Rule oriented epistemology, exemplified by Descartes’s Discourse on Method and Rules for the Direction of the Mind, provides procedural directions for acquiring knowledge, avoiding error, and conducting oneself rationally.22 By contrast, Locke’s regulative epistemology, as exemplified in Book IV of Ills Essay Concerning Human Understanding and Of the Conduct of the Understanding, aims less at the direct regulation of epistemic conduct than at the description of the habits of mind of the epistemicaily rational person. As Locke comments, Nobody is made anything by hearing of rules, or laying them up in his memory... and you may as well hope to make a good painter or musician, extempore, by a lecture and instruction in the arts of music and painting, as a coherent thinker, or a strict reasoner, by a set of rules, showing him wherein right reasoning consists. (Conduct, §4, p. 175) We need not rule-books, but a training that nurtures people in the right intellectual dispositions. Wolterstorff emphasizes that Locke focuses not on the belief-producing mechanisms or faculties that are native to the human mind, but instead on the ways in which such natural faculties are employed in more complex intellectual practices, which have a social dimension and are culturally shaped. Locke aims to reform that culture, to reshape the practices, and thus to foster in his contemporaries habits that support the reshaped practices. It is implicit in Locke’s discussions, and often explicit as well, that the habits in question are not mere habits, but virtues. Many habits are nothing more than skills— expertise in plying methods and techniques— but the habits that Locke describes are in many cases “ habits of the heart” , determinate dispositional states of concern, desire, and pleasure and pain, rather than mere habituated aptitudes. We will return to Locke when we take up the topic of intellectual practices in Chapter 5 The virtues epistemology of this book is a return to this tradition of the seventeenth century, to a regulative epistemology which, like Locke’s, describes the personal dispositions of the agent rather than providing direct rules o f epistemic action. It focuses on forming the practitioner’s character and is strongly education-oriented. The stress on intellectual virtues that has arisen among us is a start that can be felicitously developed in the regulative direction. Like Locke’s, our book is a response to a perception of deficiency in the epistemic agents of our time. But it is not a response to any particular historical upheaval or social crisis. We see a perennial set of deficiencies which in every generation need to be corrected, and a perennial positive need for formation in dispositions o f intellectual excellence. Our response to pluralism of belief systems differs from that of Locke and his fellow promoters of the life of “ reason” . Our regulative epistemology does not aim at quieting fundamental disagreement. Virtues presuppose one or another particular metaphysical or world-view background, and the prospect of securing universal agreement about that is dim. However, several of the virtues that we will discuss in Part II broaden minds and civilize intellectual exchange. The formation of excellent intellectual agents is clearly the business of schools and parents. They are the chief educators of character. But Locke and Descartes think that philosophers have a role as well, and we agree. What is that role, and how does it work? How do philosophers contribute to the regulation of intellectual character? The role that we picture for ourselves both resembles and diverges from the one that epistemologists in the twentieth century implicitly accepted for themselves.

#### And this cooperative process is uniquely good because it teaches good virtues, such as humility, which requires one to recognize cognitive limitations and epistemic authority of experts. We need to learn what authorities to trust, not to move away from trust in authorities.

**WOODS AND ROBERTS 10** (Intellectual Virtues: An Essay in Regulative Epistemology (Advances in Cognitive Models & Arch). January 4, 2010)

Thomas Reid pointed out that we humans tend to believe what we’re told. He considered this tendency “a good gift of Nature”, and the goodness he had in mind was in the first instance epistemic. Because the intellectual life is profoundly cooperative, this gift is important to us. It is a faculty, not something to suppress, eradicate, or bypass, but something to refine and develop, because we depend, and must depend, heavily on the unsupported testimony of others. Without this natural tendency, children could not get started in their cognitive lives, nor could adults come close to collecting all the truths they need to function well intellectually.

#### They Continue

The threat posed by an undisciplined credulity disposition is gullibility, but in some intellectual ambiences a wholesale fastidiousness about belief formation may be the problem. Plantinga’s discussion of testimony is less polemical than his discussion of self-knowledge, but it might have been directed against a tendency suggested by some of the writings of Descartes, Locke, and Kant. These epistemologists are suspicious of testimony because it seems to compromise the principle that each person should be responsible for his own cognitions and because testimony may seem to be a generally low-grade kind of evidence. But, given natural human limitations, and the way things go according to the human cognitive design plan, the early modern tendency to prescribe a general suspicion of tradition and testimony could be read as an endorsement of epistemic arrogance and fastidiousness an insistence on the right and duty always to “see for oneself” . A character that made us generally suspicious of testimony or overly insistent on having in our own possession all the evidence supporting each of our beliefs, would be a paralyzing intellectual paranoia, a hyperindividualism that would be both unrealistic and, to the extent that it actually got instantiated as a personality trait, detrimental to our cognitive functioning. The virtues of intellectual humility and gratitude could be regarded as a liberation of the credulity disposition from unwarranted intellectual suspicion and distrust, and thus as dispositions promoting warrant in testimony circumstances.

**Thus the standard is consistency with testimony from experienced authorities**

**A. The counterplan text is: All aff actors ought to mandate parent-child collaborative decision-making to prepare children for future decision making, Miller 09 clarifies the position:**

Miller, Victoria A. Department of Anesthesiology and Critical Care Medicine, The Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia “Parent-Child Collaborative Decision Making for the Management of Chronic Illness: A Qualitative Analysis.” Families, systems and health : the journal of collaborative family healthcare, 2009, SR.

Less attention has been paid to collaborative decision-making between clinicians and children and between parents and children. Parent-child collaborative decision-making (CDM) is particularly important, because it may facilitate the transition to greater decision-making independence during childhood and adolescence. For the purpose of the present study, CDM is defined as the way in which parents and children/adolescents engage each other in decision-making and problem solving about chronic illness management.

**B. Competition**

**1. The counterplan is mutually exclusive, adolescents don’t get the final say. Miller 2:**

This definition goes beyond a reflection of who makes decisions and, instead, captures a range of potential child and parent behaviors that might occur when a decision needs to be made (e.g., child asks the parent for advice; child and parent negotiate; parent asks for the child's opinion). This approach reflects the view that children can be meaningfully involved in decision making in multiple ways, without necessarily having shared decisional authority, and that parents typically retain a critical role as sources of support and advice, even as children and adolescents assume increasing levels of decision-making independence (Fuligni & Eccles, 1993). CDM can be differentiated from the constructs of parent social support and parent involvement because of its focus on decision making and *both* parent and child behaviors. Thus, mutual engagement is considered a key feature of CDM (Beveridge & Berg, 2007).

**2. It also competes through net benefits. Total adolescent autonomy hurts long-term autonomy. Ross 97**

Lainie Friedman Ross (PhD, American physician and bioethicist who works at the University of Chicago). “Health Care Decisionmaking by Children: Is It in Their Best Interest?” Hastings Center Report. 1997.

One reason to limit the child’s present-day autonomy is based on the argument that parents and other authorities need to promote the child’s life-time autonomy. Given the value that is placed on self-determination, it makes sense to grant adults autonomy provided that they have some threshold level of competency. Respect is shown by respecting their present project pursuits. But respect for a threshold of competency in children places the emphasis on present-day autonomy rather than on a child’s life-time autonomy. Children need a protected period in which to develop “enabling virtues”—habits, including the habit of self-control, which advance their life-time autonomy and opportunities. Although many adults would also benefit from developing their potentials and improving their skills and self-control, at some point (and it is reasonable to use the age of emancipation as the proper cut-off), the advantages of self-determination outweigh the benefits of further guidance and its potential to improve lifetime autonomy.

**But the counterplan solves, teaches adolescents how to engage themselves with big decisions. Miller 3:**

It has been hypothesized that CDM provides an opportunity for children to learn what family members take into account when making decisions, the consequences of different decisions, and the communication skills that are necessary to negotiate and influence decisions (Wills, Blechman, & McNamara, 1996). When independent decision making emerges out of a collaborative process between parents and children, children may be better prepared to make decisions effectively on their own. CDM has also been addressed in prior discussions of decision making in pediatric settings (Joffe, 2003). For example, some commentators have described ways that children can participate in decision making about treatment or health-related research without having actual decision making authority, such as being provided with information about the decision or expressing an opinion about the decision to be made (Joffe, 2003; McCabe, 1996; Weithorn, 1983). CDM may facilitate open communication among clinicians, parents, and children, increase satisfaction with medical care and cooperation with treatment, and promote the ability to cope with illness (McCabe, 1996).

**The CP uniquely has adolescents engage in a dialogue with parents and doctors who both have more experience with complex individual decisions. We shouldn’t view this as adolescents being totally unable to make decisions; rather we should give them an epistemic training period so they can make more experienced decisions in the future.**